The value of land is determined by the locations' attractiveness and the degree of regulation. When land regulations are binding, e.g. when a restriction on the maximum floor area ratio exists, the best use land price can be directly expressed as a function of the maximum floor area ratio and local amenities. We show theoretically and empirically how this approach can be used to determine land values from residential rents. From our empirical results, we derive two main sources for a monocentric structure of land prices. First, the location attractiveness of centrally located dwellings makes land prices more expensive. Second, as the maximum floor area ratio is high in central areas, the regulation works as a multiplier for land prices and inflates prices accordingly. Our model gives insights into the determinants of urban land prices and provides a useful approach for land appraisal in urban regions where land transactions are scarce. 
Introduction
In the city of Zurich, Switzerland, the number of land transactions in 2010 was 86, while the number of rental offers on one of several multiple listings service (MLS) amounts to 1,642. In general, land transactions are scarce in cities, whereas rental price observations are naturally very frequent. Moreover, negative externalities arise due to high urban densities at central locations which induces city planners to regulate building activities.
We make use of this setting and provide a unique approach that allows estimating land prices from rental prices by accounting for land-use regulation in terms of the maximum floor area ratio (F AR max ).
The floor area ratio (F AR) is defined as the total floor of a building divided by the lot size. Real estate developers maximize their profits by producing residential floor area until the optimal F AR is reached. However, when externality effects result from increased population density, effective regulations restrict the urban density. A very direct regulatory instrument is the residential floor area permitted to be built per m 2 of land. We therefore introduce the concept of F AR max . The F AR max is a special type of land use regulation with a direct economic interpretation that allows to determine land values from residential rental prices. For the real estate developer who sells and leases residential floor area, the F AR max is a device limiting the optimal floor area producible by the developer on a fixed lot of land. Given an exogenous rent for the amenities associated with the location of the real estate developer's land lot, the F AR max works as a multiplier of the total floor area rental income. Thus, under the assumption of an efficient rental market, the F AR max must be capitalized into the land value. If negative externalities do not exist, then the F AR max will ceteris paribus be proportional to the land value.
To test this hypothesis, we first formulate a theoretical model where F AR max enters the land pricing equation proportionally. We then empirically estimate land values using apartment rents and finally test them against actual land transaction prices.
The theoretical underpinning of our model is the idea that local amenities should be weighted by the land lot size in a hedonic pricing model (Parsons, 1990) . 1 For regions with homogeneous amenities, this implies that the interaction coefficients of regional dummies with land lot size reflect the variation of local per m 2 land prices. This relationship is only feasible with binding land use regulation which prevents too much building activity on a land lot. If, however, a higher residential density is associated with negative externalities (e.g., congestion, noise, or pollution), then the effect of the F AR max on land prices is not
proportional. For our model, it follows that the marginal effect is F AR ρ max , with ρ < 1.
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Based on the findings of Cai et al. (2016) , we argue that land use restrictions are likely to be binding in urban areas. In this case, the land use regulations have a direct impact on the per m 2 land price. In particular, the interaction of location with lot size can be used to determine land price variations. We empirically show how apartment rent data can be used to determine per m 2 land price by formulating a theoretical model that capitalizes the potential apartment rent into land values. The resulting land values are the outcome of two main sources, which we denote as land qualities. The first land quality is the location value, which is defined by local amenities. The second quality of land is the set of land use regulations, which determines the potential of the land to provide housing space.
3 Hence, a vacant land lot is only valuable for the real estate developer if it is endowed with building rights. The less restrictive the building regulations are, the higher the value of the land.
The effect of general land use regulations on housing prices and land prices has been widely studied (e.g., Ihlanfeldt (2007) , Kok et al. (2014) and Brueckner et al. (2017) ). One of the main findings is that more restrictive land use regulation decreases land prices and 1 Note that the weight of local amenities also depends on the nature of land use to which land is put. For instance, air and noise pollution reduces the values of output on the land for residential properties, whereas for other activities such as office buildings air and pollution can be easily eliminated by a good HVAC system and insulation. We refer to the residential market, so that our assumption on the weighting is valid. 2 The effect of F AR on house prices is only proportional (even when we ignore externalities) if the elasticity of substitution of land and structure inputs is unity. Otherwise, F AR has a non-linear and diminishing effect on land prices. Of course, ultimately this effect falls to 0 as the F AR becomes non-binding. 3 Also known as best use concept or potential ground rent mentioned in Smith (1979) . increases house prices. Similarly to these results, we find that a less restrictive land use regulation has two opposite effects on land prices. First, due to negative externalities of density, it decreases the value of local amenities and in turn decreases the apartment rents.
Second, it increases land prices due to higher supply of floor space and in turn higher rent potential. The result is an increasing but diminishing effect of land use regulation on land values. Overall, the findings discover that the elasticity of land price with respect to the F AR is a measure of building stringency.
Our approach has several practical as well as theoretical implications. First, our model allows appraising land lots in urban areas by using apartment rents. Since apartment rents are typically frequent in urban areas where land transactions are rare, the approach is particularly useful for real estate developers and investors who are interested in the price for vacant land. In addition, the approach allows estimating the land value of a property with a structure built on it. This hypothetical land value is particularly important for tax purposes, where a property must be decomposed into the value of the land and the value of the structure. Furthermore, as a by-product of the transformation of rents into land values, we estimate a land capitalization rate that capitalizes estimated land rents into land prices.
4 This capitalization rate allows us to make a smooth price prediction for land in terms of a land value surface, which may be a benchmark for a series of practical applications and future research. From a theoretical point of view, our model explains the spatial variation of land rents as well as apartment rents. We find that in urban areas, with binding land use restrictions, the land value reflects not only the location value, but to the same magnitude, the land use regulations. This finding is important in understanding urban patterns. Based on the broad literature of urban rent models, we expect that land values are monocentric. Indeed, the land value surface reveals a highly monocentric pattern in the land values of our study area. As a direct 4 In appraisal based valuation, the overall capitalization rate is defined as the value-weighted average of a building (structure) as well as a land capitalization rate (Fisher et al., 1991) . Hence, our land capitalization rate only reflects the risk associated with the location and neglects risks associated with the structure. In addition, our land capitalization rate is given in gross terms as other income, vacany losses, and operating expenses on a land lot are of small magnitude. consequence of our model, this pattern has two main sources: The first and extensively studied determinant is the high attractiveness of centrally located floor area (i.e., location value). The second source is the regulation of the maximum local floor area ratio. Thus, we are able to estimate the stringency of the F AR regulation by estimating land prices.
Based on extensive rental price data in the canton of Zurich, Switzerland, we demonstrate that the estimated land prices fit actual land transaction prices quite well, which is reflected in a correlation coefficient of 0.936. As a by-product of the transformation of estimated land rents into land prices, we estimate a land capitalization rate of 7.63%.
Further, we use our model to estimate a land price surface in the study region. We show that the monocentric structure of land prices around the City of Zurich has two sources:
the monocentric F AR max restriction and the monocentric pattern of locational values.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives a brief overview of the related literature. Section 3 contains the theoretical model and introduces the methodology. The empirical results are presented in Section 4. Section 5 concludes and summarizes the most important results.
Literature Review
The novel approach in this study draws on and contributes to several strands of literature.
First, it incorporates a concise land market into a house price model. 5 In this respect, one of the few contributions is the work of Parsons (1990) , who suggests weighting local amenities with lot size in hedonic pricing models. We follow a conceptually similar approach as attributes related to location can be considered as public goods. At the same time, more land implies more residential potential to consume these public goods. While Parsons (1990) does not empirically test his theoretical findings, Fik et al. (2003) interact 5 Note that the focus of this study and of the literature we refer to is not on the dynamic interaction of the land and the housing market. However, our model has testable implications for the land and housing market on an aggregate level, e.g., the long-term relation between land and housing prices as in Ooi and Lee (2004) .
physical attributes (land area, floor area, and age) with locations (submarket dummies)
in an empirical application. In contrast to our study, they do not account for land use regulation. Furthermore, we restrict the interaction of local amenities with lot size, while Fik et al. (2003) use a variety of different interactions.
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Second, we extract location values from apartment rent data. Rossi-Hansberg et al.
(2010) as well as Kolbe et al. (2012) estimate land prices based on a spatially nonparametric approach. The former study estimates the impact of a residential urban revitalization program on land prices in Richmond, Virginia. The authors find that the program increased land prices by 2-5% per annum. Similarly to our study and conceptually inherited from Parsons (1990) , they use per m 2 values, i.e., they weight location-related amenities by lot size. The latter study follows the same approach, however, it employs residuals from a regression of prices on physical attributes in order to predict location values. 7 Cheshire and Sheppard (1995) estimate a related model for the m 2 location value based on a rather small data sample of approximately 900 observations. The authors choose a structured functional form allowing for multiple radial asymmetries. The main differences in this study is the approach of location values capitalize into m 2 land prices as well as the specification of the functional form in the spatial dimension. To our knowledge, Kolbe et al. (2012) is the only study that compares the estimated location values to land value benchmarks. Notably, the authors use expert-based land values and location ratings, whereas we compare the estimated land values with actual land transaction data.
Moreover, our estimation process of land values is conceptually different from prevailing approaches like the residual method as well as the duality theory. The residual method is for example used by Davis and Heathcote (2007) , Davis and Palumbo (2008) as well as Glaeser et al. (2005) and develops a formal relationship between the dynamics of house prices, structure cost and land prices. Similar to our paper, Glaeser et al. (2005) use reg-6 For instance, Fik et al. (2003) find that interaction terms between age and location dummies explain variation in house prices significantly. 7 In this paper, we denote location value as the (total) location value per apartment, while the value per m 2 is denoted as land value.
ulatory restrictions as a key variable to explain land price variations. Epple et al. (2010) and Albouy et al. (2018) estimate land values based on the duality theory. In contrast to our approach, Epple et al. (2010) apply a new technique for estimating the housing production function, which allows to estimate the land share in the value of housing.
Third, land use regulation is an aspect which has been widely studied in the literature. For instance, Quigley and Rosenthal (2008) This consideration of the F AR is in line with Brueckner et al. (2017) who develop a theoretical framework that shows how land prices are affected by the F AR max . More specifically, their model explains to which extent building development decisions diverge from the free-market outcome in the presence of different levels of F AR max . Therefore, they interpret the elasticity of land price with respect to the F AR as a measure of building stringency. Cai et al. (2016) stress these findings by comparing the actual F AR of buildings in urban China to the F AR max . The authors find that the F AR effectively bounds housing construction. An alternative view on F AR is given by Bertaud and Brueckner (2005) . The authors analyze the impacts and associated welfare cost of building-height restrictions. They come to the conclusion that due to a density below the free market level in city centers, cities expand spatially and the consumer welfare loss is associated with commuting costs of a household living at the edge of a city.
Fourth, our approach enables the transformation of rent prices into land values. Besides the separation of rent prices for location and structure, this transformation requires the estimation of a land capitalization rate. In our study this indicator emerges only as a by-product of the model test, while other studies, for example Sivitanides et al. (2001) and Chichernea et al. (2008) , analyze the cross-section and time dimension of capitalization rates in the US housing market in more detail.
Finally, our study also examines the structural pattern of the resulting land prices and the F AR max . Our estimated land values as well as F AR max show a monocentric pattern around the city center, i.e., we find a negative gradient in land prices as well as density. These findings support the basic theories of the monocentric city going back to seminal works by Muth (1969) , Mills (1967) , and Alonso (1964) . However, instead of estimating a parametric model such as Coulson (1991) , we identify a monocentric structure based on a non-parametric approach.
A Simple Land Value Model

Land Use Regulation
In most countries, the use of land is, at least to some extent, regulated by local or national planning authorities. In this context, Quigley and Rosenthal (2008) give an extensive list and taxonomy of regulatory and non-regulatory instruments for land use planning.
8 The common goal of many of these instruments is to regulate the population density within an area. In the literature, there exist many empirical and theoretical studies on land use regulation and house prices. 9 Most of these studies use a regulation index without a direct economic meaning. In contrast, the restriction of the F AR, as a 8 Non-regulatory instruments are measures that regulate settlement indirectly. For instance, the absence of public services and infrastructure leads to a low building density without regulatory measures. 9 As Quigley and Rosenthal (2008) point out, a main issue in this field is the complexity of the actors involved with often ambiguous interests. Thus, identifying a causal structure, especially in a temporal context, is a very difficult task.
very explicit regulatory instrument for floor space, is considered in very few studies. For instance, a theoretical contribution by Joshi and Kono (2009) suggests implementing F AR regulations to mitigate negative population externalities. Due to the time-varying nature of an optimal F AR, they propose a transition between minimum and maximum F AR. (2014) analyze the structure and the development of the F AR gradient in New York City from 1890 to 2009 and find that it exhibits a monocentric pattern. In this long-term perspective, however, they regard the F AR as an (endogenous) outcome.
Barr and Cohen
Whether this outcome is the result of a binding land use regulation remains unclear. In contrast to the F AR measure, population density has been extensively studied from a theoretical perspective. 10 In this context, the externality effects resulting from increased population density (e.g., congestion, noise, or pollution) have been of critical importance.
In this paper, the central focus is on the residential real estate developer's land use problem. We include the effect of negative externalities associated with a high urban density. Particularly, the intention of a real estate developer is to produce as much residential floor area as allowed on his own land. In that simplified context, the relevant regulatory instruments can be limited to those which directly affect the residential floor area permitted to be built per m 2 of land. Such a measure is defined as the total floor area X divided by the land area L. Hence, the F AR is defined as:
As a regulatory instrument, the local government can impose restrictive values on the F AR for every lot of land. The most obvious way to impose such a restriction is to define a maximum floor area ratio (F AR max ). We are interested in the maximum value, which introduces a cap on the local building density. We demonstrate that for real estate developers, the maximum restriction of the F AR is a central figure which works as a multiplier with respect to the rents gained from the land lot. In this respect, the F AR is the developer's land quality, which differs from the size of the lot, denoted as land quantity. In our theoretical model, we assume best land use with binding regulation, i.e., the building exploits the land within its regulatory restrictions. Hence, it follows that
for every lot of land. We refer to this equality as best land use with binding regulation.
The assumption that the F AR max is binding is reasonable in an urban area with a relative shortage in supply of residential floor space. 11 The reason is that under a non-binding F AR max , the real estate developer would simply build more floor space as long as the marginal profit is positive, i.e., if the costs associated with the physical structure are less than the expected rent revenue. 12 In the canton of Zurich, the study area of this paper, the very low vacancy rate of 0.61% for apartments is a strong indicator of a shortage in supply of residential floor space. 13 In addition, with the constant costs of physical structure, a non-binding F AR would lead to a situation with equal marginal rent prices associated with the location (location rent). However, the empirical section will show that location rents largely vary.
In case of an apartment builder, it follows that an additional m 2 of living area requires 1/F AR max of building land. The land use efficiency assumption implies that this relationship is always fulfilled, i.e., no land is wasted and the maximum restriction is not 11 Rental apartments exclude owner-occupied apartments by definition. For this reason, the owners of rental apartments are real estate investors who own apartments for investment purposes. Typically, these kinds of real estate holders exploit land efficiently, i.e., fulfill the best land use concept. A debate related to the topic of this paper is the valuation of land under the best use assumption, originally initiated by Smith (1979) and his rent gap theory. We refer interested readers to Hammel (1999) for a detailed discussion of the rent gap theory and its criticisms. The most important aspect for this study is that the number of apartments built on a land lot is closely related to the best use assumption. 12 This model assumption is confirmed by Cai et al. (2016) who show that land developer's housing construction is largely bound by F AR regulations in major Chinese cities. The authors highlight the F AR max a highly restrictive constraint as it often lies below the optimal F AR for developers. 13 The apartment vacancy rate of 0.61% is the average in the canton of Zurich. However, the assumption that the F AR max is generally binding requires a shortage in residential floor area in the entire region. Figure A .1 in the Appendix illustrates that this is indeed the case.
violated. Thus, in order to build an apartment with living area X (size), the builder requires total land area L = X F AR . In a competitive developers' market, the assumption of best land use with binding regulation is plausible even in the context of negative externalities of population or building density. 
Local Amenities
The price of an apartment can be attributed to two kinds of amenities: physical attributes and local amenities. Locational attributes are by definition bound to the physical location of an apartment. Local amenities include, for instance, local taxation advantages, the household's relevant school districts, proximity to goods and services, as well as transport connections. While the physical structure could basically be a standardized unit, the location of the house or the apartment is always unique. From the household's perspective, the location of the land does not have a physical extent. In particular, amenities, provided externally in the form of public goods and associated with a particular location, are available independent of the size of the land. However, buying more land crowds out other potential bidders for the same location. It follows that the price of the location must somehow depend on the location quantity, i.e., the size of the land, which constitutes the location. As a consequence, the price of the location depends on the lot size. Thus, the rental price must include a location value that depends on the size of the lot of land.
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The competitiveness of locations originates in the land market. We demonstrate how the value of amenities is reflected in the land price. Our model is based on and inherits its conceptual ideas from Parsons (1990) . Consider a real estate developer who owns a parcel of land with total area L T . The land exhibits constant local amenities. The developer can divide the land into m lots of equal size. The local amenities associated with living on a lot of the developer are denoted by A. There is a construction firm from which the developer can borrow structure X at the cost of c(X). The developer can rent out each of the m composite bundles (consisting of structure and land) for a rent r(X, A, L). In this setting, the developer faces the following profit maximization problem:
Assume there exists an equilibrium characterized by a bundle
where A * is the equilibrium level of location-related attributes and X * the equilibrium structure attribute. Therefore, the rent in equilibrium is r(X * , A * , L * ). The number of equally sized land lots m
Suppose there is a potential renter who wants to rent an apartment on a lot of land which is a multiple (λL * ) of the standard lot size. In addition, he prefers a specific structureX. The builder would only sell the bundle {X,Ã,L} if 16 :
We assume that the cost and rent functions are linear. Therefore, the condition for a developer to sell a bundle {X,Ã,L} can be simplified to:
Under market competition, this simplification must hold with equality and corresponds to the rental price of the bundle with the large lot size. The price of the bundle with the
The Threefold Nature of Apartment Size
Without a loss of generality, we can set L * to unit size (one m 2 , for instance). Then, λ is the lot size in m 2 . By rearranging the pricing equation, the general rental price function is written as follows:
This corresponds to the result derived by Parsons (1990) , who suggests weighting local amenities by lot size. We now include the best land use under a binding regulation, represented by Equation (2), which states that the best use lot size is X F AR . The term r A A is the rent for a unit size location. Since we have set the unit size to one m * , we can replace r A A by r L , denoting the per m 2 land rent.
Furthermore, we assume that the extent of the land only has a positive price if there remains a free and undeveloped space, which, for example, may be used as a garden. This free space is the total land size minus the land occupied by the building. In our setting, the total land size is X F AR and the built land can be expressed as
, where N L is the number of levels of the building. The resulting free space
. Using this concept of free space, we replace the corresponding price r L by r F , where F refers to free space. Therefore, the apartment rent can be written as:
By taking the first derivative, the marginal effect of an additional m 2 in apartment size on apartment rent can be determined. This derivative is given as:
It follows that the marginal rent of an additional unit in apartment size is composed of three components. The first term is the price for an additional square meter of structure r X , which is regarded as a globally constant structure price. The second term is the rent price for free land r F . 17 Similarly to the structure rent, the value of this component is independent of the location. Finally, the third term in rent Equation (8) is the rental price for the local amenities per land unit r L . The land price therefore consists of prices for two kinds of amenities: physical amenities associated with the free space and amenities associated with the location. Only the last term is directly associated with, and therefore, dependent on the apartment's location. In this study, we are interested in the land rent r L for a set of locations. This theoretical outcome allows us to empirically derive local land values from rental data in Section 4.
The Effect of Regulatory Changes on FAR
In order to determine local land values, Equation (7) is estimated based on a hedonic regression model. To provide further interpretation of our theoretical results, we briefly outline the relationship between our exogenous and endogenous variables. Considering the third term in Equation (8) and assuming an apartment sizeX, the total location price per dwelling r d is:
Depending on the temporal scope, we expect different and ambiguous effects. First, consider a rapid and substantial increase in the F AR max in the whole urban area due to a regulatory change. This would increase the supply of floor area and decrease the corresponding rent temporarily. From this perspective, land prices r L are exogenous, while location prices of dwellings r L X F AR are endogenous. However, the change in the floor area rent will be capitalized into the equilibrium land value. It follows that rental prices are exogenous to the land values in the long run. This non-dynamic equilibrium can be analyzed cross-sectionally. In the empirical section, we estimate land rents using a global 17 The ratio
F AR·N L represents a relative weighting for the rent of free space. In case of a constant F AR, this ratio increases in the number of floors. In contrast, in case of a constant number of floors, this ratios declines with an increasing F AR hedonic function with time dummy variables, i.e., a quasi-cross-sectional specification with estimated land rents representing average values for a region. Given a particular homogeneous region, the long-term demand for residential floor area is assumed to be highly elastic and therefore constant. With an endogenous land price, it is convenient to rewrite Equation (9) as:
by augmenting the F AR with a negative externality parameter ρ. As a change in the F AR directly capitalizes into land values, the parameter ρ is the elasticity of the land price with respect to F AR:
For instance, let us consider two land lots of identical size and identical local amenities, e.g., due to their proximity. However, lot A has a twice as big F AR than lot B.
In the absence of negative externalities, the value of lot A would be double the value of lot B. In the case with negative externalities, however, lot A would be less than double the value of lot B as the F AR has a decreasing marginal effect. Formally, we model this non-proportionality as F AR ρ , with ρ < 1.
The theoretical considerations about supply of and demand for floor area are illustrated in Figure 1 . The best use assumption implies that the supply of floor area on a confined land lot is fixed by the F AR max . Therefore, the supply of floor area is perfectly inelastic, unless the regulation changes. The demand of floor area in the short run is inelastic, represented by a downward-sloping demand curve. The long-term demand, however, is highly elastic (due to the presence of alternative locations) and is represented by a horizontal line. An increase in the supply of floor area (by increasing the F AR) is not supposed to change the price of floor area in the long run. With negative externalities, however, the higher density affects the demand for the local residential floor area in a negative way, which is illustrated as a decreasing long-term demand function.
[ INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE] 4 Empirical Results
Estimation Strategy
In Subsection 3.2 we demonstrate that the value of land has a physical and location-related component. Assume the residential area is partitioned into R k subareas with k = 1...K.
The subareas are constituted by homogeneous local amenities, i.e., apartments exhibit the same local amenities within a subarea. Therefore, the resulting hedonic equation is:
where the total rental price r i is a sum of the different rent components. First, the price for physical land r F L i (r F is the rent price for the free space and L i is the size of the land lot). Second, the price for general physical attributes r Y Y i (Y i is a vector containing general physical attributes that excludes apartment size and r Y denotes a vector of corresponding rent prices). Third, the price for the physical apartment size r X X i and, lastly, the rental price for location k which is described by r
is an indicator function mapping locations to aggregated regions. 19 The location s i = {lat i , lon i } is defined by the geographical coordinates of the apartment.
In terms of rental market heterogeneity, this model states that there is only spatial heterogeneity in location prices. Spatial heterogeneity in hedonic pricing models has at least two different aspects. First, the heterogeneous structure of residuals leads to inconsistent estimates of pricing coefficients (see, e.g., Füss and Koller (2016) apartments tend to be in areas of higher quality, the omitted characteristic will increase the coefficient and vice versa.
In order to estimate location prices, we need to differentiate between the physical and the locational land value. This is achieved by including the interaction of homogeneous areas with land size: Principally, conclusions about the goodness-of-fit of the model can be drawn by comparing the predicted land values with actual transaction prices. However, it is also common to compare the goodness-of-fit with a benchmark model. Because in hedonic pricing models locational variation is often captured by location dummies, the location dummy model serves as our benchmark model. Formally, it can be written as follows:
In the case of this dummy model, the parameter r k,r L cannot be interpreted as a land rent per m 2 . However, the location dummies have the potential to capture the variation in locational values.
Transformation of Land Rents into Land Values
In this section, we demonstrate how absolute land values p k L can be estimated from relative, regional land rents r k,r L . Obviously, this transformation must include a shift in levels (because rental prices are determined in relative terms) as well as a capitalization rule , which transforms land rents into land prices. In order to keep the model tractable, we assume that a single (and constant) land capitalization rate d exists for all regions. Thus, the required transformation can be formulated as:
where δ is the level coefficient to transform the relative into an absolute rent and d is the capitalization rate for the land value. Hence, the term δ d refers to the level factor which transforms the relative land price into the absolute land price. One possible approach is to make assumptions about δ and d, as well as about land price predictions. However, we use observed regional land price data to estimate these coefficients in order to test the validity of our implicit land price model. While model testing is the main purpose of our estimation strategy, we additionally derive an estimate for this land capitalization rate.
In appraisal based valuation, the overall capitalization rate is defined as the valueweighted average of a building (structure) as well as a land capitalization rate (Fisher et al., 1991) . Hence, our land capitalization rate only reflects the risk linked to the location and neglects risks associated with the structure. In addition, our land capitalization rate is given in gross terms. However, the difference to the net capitalization rate is small as other income, vacancy losses, and operating expenses on a land lot are of small magnitude.
Data and Study Area
Our empirical analysis uses an extensive data set for the canton of Zurich, Switzerland, an ideal study area as the canton's land use regulation is subsidiary to a national land use plan. The building law in Zurich allows for a wide range of measures to "establish a foundation for human development." 20 This variety of instruments makes the consideration of individual regulatory measures impossible. Therefore, we restrict our attention to the most important, and for our analysis sufficiently adequate, regulatory measure: the F AR, which is defined as the maximal total living area S T divided by total lot area L T .
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The variation of the FAR in the canton of Zurich is depicted in Figure 5 .
The first data source for our dataset is the parcel data record provided by the statistical office of the canton of Zurich. This geographic information system (GIS) data contains the location and shape of all land parcels in the canton of Zurich as well as the corresponding building rights and regulations (including the F AR). By using the coordinates of the rental data, the apartment's underlying land as well as its building rights can be determined. This rental price data stems from our second data source: a multiple listings service (MLS). Overall, our data contains more than 40,000 observations from 2002 to 2014 including a wide set of apartment characteristics for the categories rental price, structure, location, and time, as shown in 
Testing the Model
In Section 3, we outline theoretically how the relative rental price is transformed into absolute land prices. Now we make use of regional land prices to empirically test the model in two steps. In the first step, we estimate the model of relative implicit land rents, p r k , according to Equation (13). In the second step, these estimates are compared to observed regional land prices as suggested in Equation (15). To derive the level coefficient δ and the land capitalization rate d, we run a regression of regional (aggregated) average land prices on our implicit relative land rents for the corresponding regions. We can now calculate the difference of the relative land rents of the two apartments, which amounts to 4551.8 CHF -(-299.3 CHF) = 4,851.1 CHF. Hence, we estimate that the rent associated with the land of the first apartment is 4,851.1 CHF higher than the rent of the second apartment. In other words, the 4,851.1 CHF of the rent difference can be explained by differences in the attractiveness of the location combined with the difference in the required land consumption. In contrast to relative land rents, the coefficients of the physical characteristics (hedonics) are estimated globally, i.e. without a location interaction. For instance, the estimated annual price for a m 2 of floor area is 174.9
CHF. Furthermore, an important result of the estimation is that the coefficient of the efficient land size is very small. This means that the rent associated with the free land is economically negligible for the rental apartments in our data set.
In the second step, we compare the implicit relative land prices to the observed absolute mean land prices of the planning regions. Figure 3 shows the scatter plot of the two variables. This graph indicates a strong linear dependence that is also reflected in a high correlation coefficient of 0.936 between actual and predicted land values.
[ INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE] Moreover, the results of the linear regression in Equation (15) of (aggregated) effective land prices on implicit land rents are summarized in Table 2 . Columns (2) to (5) are based on the results of the interaction model, specified in Equation (13). More specifically, in columns (2) to (4), we perform the analysis for different sub-periods as a robustness test of the main results for the whole sample period, which are given in column (5). In the respective columns, the land capitalization rate for each sub-sample is given as well which allows identifying its temporal development. Column (6) uses the regression results of the location dummy model, specified in Equation (14), which serves as a benchmark for our baseline estimation.
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE]
For the whole time period, we conclude that our prediction of land price data is accurate. The high R 2 on an aggregate level suggests high accuracy of the land prediction model. The result does not only provide supporting evidence for our theoretical model, but also makes it feasible for practical applications. In other words, it shows how differences in local amenities finally capitalize into land prices. In addition, the analysis of different sub-periods indicates that these results remain robust over time.
Further, the comparison of land price predictions with the location dummy model shows a favorable result for the interaction model. As the R 2 of the two models indicates, the goodness-of-fit of the interaction model is higher, and thus, outperforms the benchmark model. However, the difference in the R 2 is relatively small, which most likely can be traced back to the aggregation effect since predictions are tested against aggregated land prices of planning regions. On this level of aggregation, the variation of the F AR max is likely to be averaged out to some degree. Nevertheless, the goodness-of-fit is higher for the interaction approach.
As a by-product of the goodness-of-fit test, we report the level and slope coefficients in Table 2 . The slope estimate of 13.110 corresponds to the inverse of the land capitalization rate. For the whole sample period, the capitalization rate for the land value is therefore 1/13.110 = 7.63%, which is relatively high compared to discount rates of real estate development projects and may be biased due to the previously mentioned specification error (Glaeser et al., 2005) . Moreover, as mentioned earlier, this land capitalization rate is in gross terms, i.e., the rent related to a land lot excludes the costs associated with the provision of a dwelling. In addition, since our analysis is restricted to the location value (rather than the value of physical characteristics), the land capitalization rate corresponds to the location rent and location price, respectively. Presuming that the risk associated with the location of the real estate is higher than that associated with its structure, a higher rate is not surprising. Concerning the temporal development, the land capitalization rate strongly decreased from 2002 to 2014, with a land capitalization rate of 5.68% for the recent sub-period 2010-2014. This finding is in line with a decreasing interest rate over the same time period. 26 The estimation of the level coefficient δ and the land capitalization rate d allows us to identify a further parameter: the global negative externality parameter ρ. The parameter is obtained by maximizing the goodness-of-fit in the second step regression:
We estimate a value of ρ = 0.65, which means that the F AR is associated with negative externalities. The goodness-of-fit of the second step regression (in terms of R 2 )
is shown in Figure A .2 in the Appendix. A negative externality parameter of 0.65 implies a diminishing effect of the F AR on land prices, e.g., the effect of a F AR of 2 on land prices is 2 0.65 or 1.569.
Land Value Surface
In the previous section, we have shown that the implicit land price model is able to fit land price transaction data accurately. As a by-product of this test, we estimated coefficients that allow us to predict land prices from implicit land rents. Based on these results, we are able to estimate a land value surface by smoothing the predicted (implicit) land values.
For this purpose, we spatially generalize the rent function in Equation (12) to receive
In particular, we run a non-parametric local regression of land price predictions (at individual level) on the longitude and latitude values. The model specification is based on the Nadaraya-Watson local constant estimator:
27 We follow the notations of Clapp and Wang (2006) for the specification of the hedonic pricing model.
where
We use a Gaussian Kernel function K(.) with a bandwidth h, which is determined by cross-validation. As a result, we get a smooth surface of relative residential rents.
Based on Equation (15), these estimates are transformed into land value estimates. The corresponding smooth land value surface is illustrated in Figure 4 .
[ INSERT FIGURE 4 HERE] The predicted land prices in the canton of Zurich obtain a monocentric structure around the center of Zurich city. The gradient does not have the same magnitude in every direction. Particularly, the slope of gradient is significantly lower alongside the lake. Besides the city of Zurich, different local elevations in land prices can be identified around the city of Winterthur.
In the next step, we need to highlight how the predicted land values of the canton of Zurich can be explained by major land attributes. First, note that the land price surface smooths out the micro-location to some degree. Therefore, it is primarily associated with macro-location values. Our findings are largely in line with Kubli et al. (2008) and confirm that the macro-location is indeed the most important determinant of land prices in this area. The corresponding land attributes are distance to CBD, tax level, and proximity to the lake. Because proximity to the lake is a matter of the larger environmental situation, we classify it as a macro-location attribute as well. A closer look to the city of Zurich in Figure 4 illustrates the multi-radial monocentric land prices in more detail. The center is located next to the lake, very close to the CBD. As the contour lines indicate, land prices along the lakeside decrease much slower compared to all other directions.
Dual Monocentric Structure
From a theoretical perspective, we have argued that the best use lot size is a promising measure for determining land values and we have shown empirically that the predicted land values fit the actual data well. In particular, interacting the best use lot size with local amenities is successful for land price determination. In this section, we restrict the analysis to the metropolitan region of Zurich to demonstrate the monocentric structure of implicit land prices and to illustrate how the role of land use regulation is reflected in this pattern of implicit land prices.
The predicted land value is the product of location value per m 2 and land quality.
We can decompose these two factors and analyze them visually. First, we focus on the central location's attractiveness, which is reflected in the left panel of Figure 5 . The graph shows a non-parametric surface of the location value. The CBD has the highest value and location prices are decreasing in all directions. However, the monocentric structure is distorted and irregular, with the lakeside naturally being the main source of irregularity for the location value. In summary, location values exhibit a monocentric structure, even without controlling for non-monocentric location amenities such as proximity to the lake.
Second, the fact that the F AR is higher in central areas increases land rents in the CBD. Due to the correlation between these two location characteristics (location attractiveness and F AR), the implicit land prices exhibits considerable variation. Indeed, the building regulation aims at a high F AR in central locations, where the location value is already high. The obvious reason for this policy is to reduce prices for dwellings at favorable, central locations.
[ INSERT FIGURE 5 HERE] Finally, the predicted land values as the product of location quality and land quality are shown in Figure 6 . The interaction of location value and location quality is embodied in this surface. The monocentric structure of land quality has clearly shaped the land price patterns into oval gradients. However, the pattern of the location values dominates the high value locations along the lakeside. In addition, the location value determines the center of the monocentric structure in land prices. Indeed, the highest land price is not in the CBD, but slightly more northward next to the lake. In this area, very high local amenities meet a relatively high F AR, making this location the most valuable land in the canton of Zurich.
[ INSERT FIGURE 6 HERE] 5 Conclusion
In this paper, we show that under binding land use regulation, the per m 2 price of land is a direct function of the local amenities and the restrictiveness of regulations. Thereby, we use the F AR max , a very common regulatory instrument in the study area, to formulate a simple model that emphasizes the best land use assumption, i.e. the optimal exploitation of the land under regulation. In the model, we show that an additional unit of apartment surface requires 1/F AR max units of land. Moreover, for a constant F AR max , it can be proven that the marginal price for the apartment size has three rent components:
the presumably constant rents for structure and physical land, as well as the land-rent inherent location value.
In the case of binding F AR max , the interaction of locations with lot size under best use is a promising approach to determine land price variations from land rents. Therefore,
we formulate a theoretical model in which the potential apartment rent is capitalized into land values. We then show empirically how to use apartment rent data to determine per m 2 land prices by applying the model to a hedonic setting based on an extensive sample of rental data in the canton of Zurich. This linear transformation of rent components into land prices estimates the land capitalization rate as a coefficient as well.
We demonstrate that our model is highly reliable in predicting land prices. In As a by-product of the goodness-of-fit test of our model, we estimate a land capitalization rate of 7.63%. This finding is interesting from an asset pricing perspective.
Particularly, it can serve as a benchmark capitalization rate for real estate investments.
However, the derived return on investment cannot be compared to capitalization rates used for real estate appraisal purposes, because it is a gross rate and is associated with the land value only.
In a final step, we utilize our findings from the model test to estimate a land value surface. In doing so, the number of observations allows us to use a non-parametric approach to predict land values for any location. Concentrating on the metropolitan region of Zurich, we find a monocentric pattern in the predicted land values. This monocentricity is the result of two main sources affecting the urban spatial structure: First, the monocentric location value pattern is the result of higher amenities in central locations.
Second, the monocentric land quality pattern is the result of land use regulation, i.e., the result of the higher permitted floor area ratios in central areas. Thus, when estimating land values, and especially, when the location values stem from regression residuals, land quality should be accounted for. Tables   Table 1: Estimation Results of Hedonic Regression with Interaction Terms   This table shows the regression results for the model of relative implicit rents according to Equation (13). Besides the hedonic rental prices for different apartment characteristics, the coefficients represent the implicit relative land prices for regions 1 to K in the canton of Zurich, which are reflected in the interaction terms (reg id) given by regiondummies (ID) times the ef f icient land size (ef f land). Due to the small number of observations in some municipalities, only 128 out of 171 regions are included. This table shows the regression results of regional (aggregated) average land prices on implicit relative land rents of each planning region (Equation (15)). M RE stands for mean relative error. The land capitalization rate is the inverse of the slope. These figures are either based on the results of the interaction model (Equation (13)) or the dummy model (Equation (14)), which serves as a benchmark model. Moreover, figures are calculated for different sub-periods (columns (2) to (4)) as well as for the whole time period from 2002 to 2014 (column (5) and (6)). The land capitalization rate decreases over the three sub-periods from 10.38% (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) to 5.68% (2010) (2011) (2012) (2013) (2014) . The number of observations is 121. Heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors are shown in parentheses.
Model
Interaction This figure shows the relationship between the price and quantity of land. In a homogeneous, regional housing market the short-term demand for residential floor is assumed to be unit elastic, while the longterm demand is perfectly elastic. The introduction of negative externalities by accounting for the price elasticity of land with respect to the maximum allowed floor area ratio (F AR) affects the long-term demand negatively. It follows that a change in the F AR directly capitalizes into land values due to its decreasing marginal effect. This figure shows the predicted land values as the product of location quality and land quality. The oval gradients of land prices reflect the monocentric structure of land quality in the metropolitan region of Zurich. High location values can be observed along the lakeside as well as more in the north next to the lake, i.e., high floor area ratios reflect high local amenities.
